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Faculty and Deans

GENERIC FRAUD AND THE UNIFORM
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT
Peter A. Alces*
INTRODUCTION

Holmes imagined the "bad man,, 1 a creature of legal analysis
designed to focus the judge's or lawmaker's or even attorney's attention on the practical ramifications of a particular legal rule. 2 So long
as Holmes could see how a bad man would perceive the legal landscape, Holmes could appraise the formulation of a given proscription
or set of proscriptions and prescriptions and understand the law's operation. The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFfA") is such a
set of proscriptions and prescriptions. 3 But the bad man to which I
allude is not necessarily bad, except perhaps from the perspective of
an all-assets secured creditor.4 It seems the way for large institutional
secured creditor interests to evaluate the UFTA's provisions is to imagine how counsel for an unsecured creditor of the debtor/transferor
might attack a transfer of a security interest in all or substantially all
of the debtor's assets. If counsel for the transferees in such transactions can anticipate the arguments of unsecured creditors' attorneys,
• Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis School of Law;
Associate Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law; A.B. 1977, Lafayette College; J.D. 1980, University of Illinois. The author is writing a treatise tentatively entitled
Fraudulent Transactions, to be published in 1989 by Warren, Gorham & Lamont, in which
portions of this article will appear in another form. L. Landis Sexton, J.D. 1988, University of
Alabama, provided invaluable research and editorial assistance in preparing this article.
I Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897).
2 Holmes explains:
Take the fundamental question, What constitutes the law? You will find some text
writers telling you that it is something different from what is decided by the courts
of Massachusetts or England, that it is a system of reason, that it is a deduction
from principles of ethics or admitted axioms or what not, which may or may not
coincide with the decisions. But if we take the view of our friend the bad man we
shall find that he does not care two straws for the axioms or deductions, but that
he does want to know what the Massachusetts or English courts are likely to do in
fact. I am much of his mind. The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact,
and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.
ld. at 460-61.
3 U.F.T.A., 7A U.L.A. 643 (1985).
4 Commercial finance all-assets lending contemplates a significant extension of credit, repayment of which is secured by all or virtually all of the debtor's personal and real property.
The loan is made against the strength of the debtor's assets and not solely on the basis of his
general reputation or business performance. See A Ices, The Efficacy of Guaranty Contracts in
Sophisticated Commercial Transactions, 61 N.C.L. Rev. 655, 660 n.29 (1983) (citing PLI,
Commercial Finance, Factoring and Other Asset-Based Lending 11 (1980)).
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those arguments may be preempted by careful structuring of transactions in order to avoid fraudulent transfer attack. If state legislatures
believe that particular imaginative arguments of junior creditors
should not prevail, the legislature can draft or amend the fraudulent
transfer law in order to assure the results deemed most commercially
desirable.
To more concretely and particularly explain the nature of the
issues considered in this Article, put yourself in the position of counsel for a creditor who discovers that a corporation to which the creditor has advanced trade or unsecured credit is unable to discharge its
obligation to your unsecured creditor client. It quickly becomes apparent that while your client will be left with a specious claim against
the debtor, ABC Finance Company ("ABC") will cash out its claim
against the debtor at roughly one hundred cents on the dollar because
ABC has a security interest in substantially all of the debtor's assets.
The ostensible inequity of that result troubles your client, even after
you explain to him the social and microeconomic attraction of Uniform Commercial Code article 9. 5
The client asks if anything can be done to help him realize something from the debtor's carcass. Here's where the "bad man" theory
becomes a useful analytical tool. What would the unsecured creditor's counsel (the bad man) think up in order to attack ABC's security
interest? Recent developments6 and scholarship' in commercial law
suggest that courts may gaze fondly upon the creative theories developed by counsel on behalf of unsecured or otherwise downtrodden
5 For exhaustive treatments of the microeconomic efficiency of secured. lending, see Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 Yale L.J. 1143 {1979);
Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, lO J.
Legal Stud. I (1981); Scott, Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure, 32 J.
Fin. I (1977); Smith & Warner, Bankruptcy, Secured Debt and Optimal Capital Structure:
Comment 34 J. Fin. 247 (1979).
6 Durrett v. Washington Nat'1 Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980) (invalidating mortgage foreclosure sale as fraudulent conveyance because sale realized inadequate proceeds). cr.
Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511,209 Cal. Rptr. 551
(1985) (bank liable to commercial customer for claiming spurious legal defenses to avoid paying for its prior negligent acts); Sun 'n Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671,
582 P.2d 920, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1978) (bank m.ay be liable for negligent exchange of commercial papers). In a similar vein, consider the creative use of fraud and misrepresentation
theories in what are essentially breach of contract cases to circumvent operation of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") Article 2 parol evidence rule, U.C.C. § 2-202 (1986), and
warranty disclaimer provision, U.C.C. § 2-316 (1986). See Mitcheii-Lockyer, Common Law
Misrepresentation in Sales Cases-An Argument for Code Dominance, 19 Forum 361 (1984).
7 See Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 505
(1977); Schechter, The Principal Principle: Controlling Creditors Should Be Held Liable for
Their Debtors' Obligations, 19 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 875 (1986); American Bar Association,
Emerging Theories of Lender Liability (H. Chartman ed. 1985).
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creditors. In the course of reviewing the available theories, you come
across the UFTA, which has recently become law in your jurisdiction. 8 After perusing the several sections of the new Act, you find
nothing either expressly in the text or more subtly in the comments
directly addressing your client's dilemma.9 As best as you can discern, your client's position deteriorated at the time the debtor granted
an all-assets security interest to ABC. For purposes of this Article,
assume that the security interest was granted either (1) as a part of a
leveraged business acquisition, or (2) to secure debtor's upstream or
cross-stream guaranty of the indebtedness of a parent or affiliate
corporation.
This Article will suggest how enterprising commercial counsel
might conjure up a construction of the UFTA to make a disappointed
unsecured creditor whole when an upstream or cross-stream guaranty
or a leveraged. business acquisition has impaired the unsecured creditor's position. I suggest that generic fraud principles, working in tandem with the UFTA's actual or intentional fraud provisions, provide
the basis for attacking the grant of a:Q. all-assets security interest in the
8 Choice of law principles may be apposite in deciding which body of fraudulent transfer
law will be effective in a particular jurisdiction. Sixteen states have adopted the UFTA: Arkansas, Bill No. 967 (76th Gen. Assembly Reg. Sess. 1987) (copy on file at the Cardozo Law
Review); California, Cal. Civ. Code§§ 3439-3439.12 (West Supp. 1987); Florida, House Bill
No. 236 (1987) (copy on file at the Cardozo Law Review); Hawaii, Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 65lc-l
to -10 (1985); Idaho, Idaho Code§§ 55-910 to -922 (Supp. 1987); Maine, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
tit. 14, §§ 3571-3582 (Supp. 1986); Minnesota, Minn. Stat. Ann.§§ 513.20 to .32 (West 1987)
(copy on file at the Cardozo Law Review); Nevada, Assembly Bill No. 60 (1987) (copy on file
at the Cardozo Law Review); New Hampshire, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.§§ 545A:1 to :12 (1987)
(copy on file at the Cardozo Law Review); North Dakota, N.D. Cent. Code§§ 13-02.1-01 to10 (Supp. 1987); Oklahoma (1986), Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, §§ 112-123 (West 1987); Oregon,
Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 95.200 -.310 (Supp. 1987); Rhode Island, R.I. Gen. Laws§§ 6-16-1 to -12
(Supp. 1986); South Dakota, S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 54-SA-1 to -12 (Supp. 1987); Texas,
House Bill No. 2193 (70th Reg. Sess. 1987) (copy on file at the Cardozo Law Review); West
Virginia, W.Va. Code§§ 40-1A-1 to -12 (Supp. 1987). Seventeen states and the Virgin Islands
have in force the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act ("UFCA"), predecessor to the UFfA:
Arizona, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§§ 44-1001 to -1013 (1967 & West Supp. 1986); Delaware, Del.
Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 1301 -1312 (1975); Maryland, Md. Com. Law Code Ann.§§ 15-201 to214 (1983); Massachusetts, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. l09A, §§ 1 - 13 (West 1958); Michigan,
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 566.11 -.23 (West 1967); Montana, Mont. Code Ann. §§ 31-2-301
to -325 (1985); Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 36-601 to -613 (1984); New Jersey, N.J. Stat.
Ann. §§ 25:2-7 to -19 (West 1940); New Mexico, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 56-10-1 to -13 (1978 &
Supp. 1986); New York, N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law§§ 270-281 (McKinney 1945); Ohio, Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1336.01 to .12 (Anderson 1979); Pennsylvania, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 39,
§§ 351-363 (Purdon 1954); Tennessee, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 66-3-301 to -314 (1982); Utah,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-1-1 to -16 (1984); Virgin Islands, V.I. Code Ann. tit. 28, §§ 201-12
(1976); Washington, Wash. Rev. Code Ann.§§ 19.40.010-.130 (1978); Wisconsin, Wis. Stat.
Ann.§§ 242.01 -.13 (West 1987); Wyoming, Wyo. Stat.§§ 34-14-101 to -113 (1977).
9
See Alces & Dorr, A Critical Analysis of the New Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act,
1985 U. Ill. L. Rev. 527, 558-64.
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guaranty and LBO settings. 10 Trust me; this is not entirely alchemy. 11
And the point is not so much to provide plaintiff's counsel a theory as
it is to demonstrate the uncertain scope of fraud principles and to
suggest means by which the UFTA's drafters could and should have
confronted secured guaranties and LBO's head-on rather than settling
for the status quo.
First, this inquiry will explain more completely the secured guaranty and LBO contexts in order to provide an accurate picture of the
interests implicated and to suggest the policy choices involved. The
Article will then treat generic fraud law, built, as it is, upon principles
drawn from the law of misrepresentation and deceit. The means of
incorporating generic fraud into the intentional fraudulent transfer
calculus are considered: only then can fraud law's pervasive nature be
appreciated and a commercially plausible concept of intent be framed.
I conclude by suggesting how the UFTA might be adjusted either to
foreclose or expressly sanction the accommodation of the interests
considered in this Article.
DISTINGUISHING FRAUDULENT INTENT FROM
INTENT TO DEFRAUD

It does not make sense to consider the application of the UFTA
and generic fraud principles without reference to particular commercial transactions. Before a useful analysis of such an application can
be understood by those representing commercial transactors, it is necessary to describe the parties to the transaction and the context in
which their interests become entangled. Therefore, I begin with a description of potentially fraudulent guaranty transactions and leveraged business acquisitions. It is necessary to treat the business setting,
the scholarly commentary which has considered fraudulent transfer
issues, and developing case law.
A. Secured Guaranties as Fraudulent Transfers
In his classic article, Professor Rosenberg distinguished between
three types of guaranty transactions: 12 downstream guaranties (parent guarantees obligation of subsidiary), cross-stream (sister corporation guarantees obligation of sister corporation), and upstream
to U.F.T.A. § 10 expressly sanctions reference to supplementary principles of law, including common law fraud and misrepresentation. U.F.T.A. § 10, 7A U.L.A. 666 (1985).
II But see W. Shakespeare, Hamlet III, act iii, scene 2, lines 229-30. ("Ham: Madam, how
like you this play? Queen: The (law professor] doth protest too much, methinks.").
12 Rosenberg, Intercorporate Guarantees and the Law of Fraudulent Conveyances: Lender
Beware, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 235 (1976) (discussing the UFCA and pre-1979 bankruptcy Jaw).
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guaranties (subsidiary guarantees obligation of parent). 13 When a
parent guarantees a subsidiary's obligation, there is no constructive
fraudulent transfer problem. As an investor in the subsidiary, the
parent merely protects and enhances the value of its investment by
guaranteeing the subsidiary's debt. In return for the obligation incurred-the grant of a security interest in assets of the parent-the
parent derives an equal and direct benefit--enhancement of the value
of its investment in the subsidiary.
In the cross-stream and upstream contexts fraudulent transfer
law may rear its ugly head. When a subsidiary grants an all-assets
security interest to collateralize a guaranty of its parent's debt, the
subsidiary is incurring an obligation, i.e., the security interest, without
a counterbalancing benefit. The secured party has normally made
loan funds available to the parent, and the subsidiary's financial position is not directly enhanced by the parent's receipt of those funds.
Rosenberg further argues that hypothecation of assets without any
consideration will be subject to attack as a constructively fraudulent
transfer if the subsidiary is rendered insolvent as a result of the grant
of the security interest. 14 In the normal course, any corporation asked
to secure its guaranty obligation will be rendered insolvent because
the guaranty obligation constitutes a liability and the asset represented by the loan proceeds will appear on the parent's financial statement.15 The same conclusion follows from the dynamic of a crossstream guaranty. Because one of two affiliated corporations does not
directly benefit from the other's receipt of loan funds, an affiliate that
grants an all-assets security interest to secure its guaranty of the affiliate's indebtedness is rendered insolvent. 16
It should not shock anyone to hear that the commercial community, or at least that portion of it represented by lender's counsel,
found Rosenberg's analysis flawed. It seems that he had not properly
factored in the value represented by the guarantor's "valuable" comSee id. at 238-39, 262-65.
14 Section 5(a) of the UFfA states:
A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a credi• tor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred
if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation and the debtor
was insolvent at that time or the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer
or obligation.
U.F.T.A. § 5(a), 7A U.L.A. 657.
1 s The asset represented by the loan proceeds will be balanced on the parent's financial
statement by the security interest the parent had to grant to secure repayment.
16 See Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 252-57.
13
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mon law contribution 17 and subrogation 18 rights. If, indeed, the guarantor were called upon to perform under the guaranty and the
creditor/guaranteed party had to look to the guarantor's assets, the
guarantor would then be subrogated to the rights of the secured creditor against the principal debtor. If there were other guarantors, the
cross-stream or upstream guarantors could collect their pro-rata share
of the discharged indebtedness by operation of contribution principles. William Coquillette explained how Rosenberg erred, 19 after
describing the desirability of upstream guaranties.20
Perceived more as a problem of valuation than of legal substance,
the guaranty-as-fraudulent-transfer debate became a matter which
could be treated on an ad hoc basis; valuations urged by interested
parties could determine whether fraudulent transfer law would void
the security interest granted by the guarantor.21
Cases in which fraudulent transfer issues were presented in the
guaranty context did little to advance the analysis posited by commentators. Rosenberg argued that the contingent subrogation and
contribution rights were actually worth nothing or virtually nothing
because the guarantor would only be called upon to perform under
the guaranty after the principal obligor was already or very nearly
insolvent. 22 While the practical wisdom of that observation is not unassailable, it does to a considerable extent conform to the realities attending the documentation of a secured guaranty as part of an allassets commercial finance transaction. In re 0/lag Construction
17

See Schwartz v. Commissioner, 560 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1977) (right of contribution from
third party is an asset); Wingert v. Hagerstown Bank, 41 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1930) (right of
contribution is an asset); O'Grady v. First Union Nat') Bank, 296 N.C. 2i2, 250 S.E.2d 587
'
(1978) (right of contribution may vary with change in contract).
IS See Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Goodman (In re Ollag Constr.), 578 F.2d 904
(2d Cir. 1978) (subrogation rights may be valued as assets to determine solvency); First Nat'!
Bank v. Jefferson Sales & Distribs., 341 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Miss. 1971) (subrogation right
applied where equity requires), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1972); Sterling Factors Corp. v.
Freeman, 50 Misc. 2d 715, 271 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (guarantor's rights subrogated to
creditor's claims to inventory in exchange for creditor's foregoing mortgage foreclosure), aff'd,
27 A.D.2d 956, 279 N.Y.S.2d 571 (1967).
19 Coquillette, Guaranty of and Security for the Debt of a Parent Corporation by a Subsidiary Corporation, 30 Case W. Res. 433, 450-56 (1 qso).
20 ld. at 435-38 (describing situations where. upstream guaranties might be desirable, as
when parent/holding company owns several subsidiaries enabling superior financing terms
than individual subsidiaries could achieve). See also Note, Upstream Financing and Use of the
Corporate Guaranty, 53 Notre Dame L. Rev. 840 (1978); Note, The Corporate Guaranty
Revisited: Upstream, Downstream, and Beyond-A Statutory Approach, 32 Rutgers L. Rev.
312 (1979).
21 Alces, supra note 4, at 681 (suggesting "going-concern" valuation of debtor's assets in
bankruptcy).
22 Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 256.
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Equipment 23 refused to follow Rosenberg's analysis. Judge Kaufman,
writing for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, concluded that, at
least on the facts of 0/lag, the contingent contribution and subrogation rights should be considered as having some value. 24
The problem, of course, is with the time at which the valuation
should be done for purposes of determining whether the assumption
of guaranty liability renders the guarantor insolvent. A guaranty is a
form of insurance; at least that is how lenders perceive it. If the principal obligor is unable to repay the creditor, the creditor will proceed
against either the guarantor, the hypothecated assets of the guarantor,
the assets of the principal obligor, or all three and any additional
available sources. It is impossible to fix the value of the contingent
contribution and subrogation rights at the time the guaranty liability
is assumed. Indeed, were the lender certain that the guaranty would
not be enforced there would be no reason (save leverage)25 to insist
upon it, and were the lender certain that it would be enforced, it is
exceedingly unlikely that the lender would enter into the transaction
in the first place. Moreover, the lender knows that uncertainty at the
outset. But does it matter that the guarantor would know of it also?
After all, by the time fraudulent transfer litigation is initiated it is
clear that the guarantor's judgment was not infallible. The object is to
effect the most equitable distribution to creditors-all of the creditors.
But it is not enough that the contribution or subrogation rights
are so discounted as to render the guarantor insolvent. Assumption
of guaranty liability may only be attacked as a constructive fraudulent
transfer if the guarantor did not receive "a reasonably equivalent
value in exchange for the" guaranty. 26 Rosenberg's whole point was
that in the cross-stream and upstream guaranty contexts, the guarantor really did not receive anything of value, much less reasonably
equivalent value. 27
A recent guaranty case took a different view of the value received
by the guarantor.28 A doctor who had incorporated himself caused
the professional corporation to execute a guaranty of his indebtedness
to lender; the guaranty was secured by the professional corporation's
6

578 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1978).
ld. at 908. See also Syracuse Eng'g Co. v. Haight, 97 F.2d 573, 576 (2d Cir. 1938)
(claim's value in subrogation against the principal must be counted as an asset); Updike v.
Oakland Motor Car Co., 53 F.2d 369, 371 (2d Cir. 1931) (contingent claim based on guaranteed customer notes excluded as a liability).
25 See Alces, supra note 4, at 660.
26 See U.F.T.A. § S(a), 7A U.L.A. 657 (1985).
27 Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 240-57.
28 In re Ear, Nose & Throat Surgeons, 49 Bankr. 316 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985).
23

24
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accounts receivable. The doctor used the loan proceeds for personal
purposes and the guarantor-corporation did not benefit by any more
than an $8,000 discharge of tax indebtedness.
In deciding whether the guaranty obligation could be avoided as
a fraudulent conveyance under the Bankruptcy Code,29 the court had
to consider whether the professional corporation had received reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the guaranty. 30 The bankruptcy
court noted the general rule that a debtor has not received reasonably
equivalent value "where it transfers its property in exchange for a
consideration which passes to a third party."31 However, Judge Glennon also recognized an exception to that rule: "where the debtor and
the third party 'are so related or situated that they share an "identity
of interests" because what benefits one will, in such case, benefit the
other to some degree.' " 32
Once again, valuation is the focus. A court must decide whether
there was sufficient vicarious benefit by considering the value actually
realized by the guarantor. In the Ear, Nose and Throat Surgeons matter, the bankruptcy court decided that the professional corporation,
the doctor/guarantor, received "significantly less than the value" received by the principal obligor, the doctor/individuaP3 The court
decided that as a result of undertaking the guaranty liability, the contingent liability represented by the guaranty effectively made the guarantor insolvent.
Ear, Nose and Throat Surgeons concerned constructive fraud,
and supports Rosenberg's perception of the economic and legal reality
surrounding upstream guaranties, though not in the intercorporate
setting. The case well illustrates the standard fraudulent transfer
analysis, even though it did not treat the valuation of subrogation and
contribution rights issues considered in Ol/ag. 34 Together, however,
the two opinions capture the contours of the issue, though the opinions seem to subscribe to inconsistent views of the underlying policy
issues.35 These policy concerns are reconsidered in the next section of
11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
II U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B) (i), (ii) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
31 49 Bankr. at 320 (citing In re Royal Crown Bottlers, Inc., 23 Bankr. 28, 30 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 1982)).
Jz Id. (quoting In re Royal Crown Bottlers, Inc., 23 Bankr. 28, 30 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982)
(citing Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979, 992-93 (2d Cir. 1981))); In
re Winslow Plumbing, Heating & Contracting, 424 F. Supp. 910, 914-15 (D. Conn. 1976).
33 49 Bankr. at 320.
34 See cases cited supra note 18.
JS Regarding guaranties and fraudulent transfer Jaw, see First Nat'! Bank v. Jefferson Sales
& Distribs., 341 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Miss. 1971), atf'd, 460 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1972);
Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 13 Ariz. App. 431 , 477 P.2d 550 (1970).
29

30
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this Article. But first, consider the equities and policies surrounding
fraudulent transfer treatment of leveraged business acquisitions.
An illustration of the garden variety LBO accommodates analysis of the issues.
The aging management and shareholders (sellers) of a privately
held company approach a group interested in acquiring the company. Ambition-rich but relatively cash-poor, the acquisition
group arranges financing through a bank or commercial finance
company. The lender advances the loan proceeds against the assets
(accounts receivable, inventory, equipment, real property) of the
acquired company. The acquisition group pays for the sellers' interest in cash (and perhaps a promissory note). Sellers transfer
ownership of the company and its assets to the acquisition group
subject to the security and perhaps mortgage interest of the lender.
The individual members of the acquisition group, at the insistence
of the secured lender, often will execute personal (usually secured)
guaranties of the acquisition loan. 36

The problem from the perspective of junior unsecured creditors is that
the corporate entity to which they had been supplying credit is no
longer as financially viable as it was before the LBO. The corporation
whose assets have been leveraged purportedly benefits from the infusion of new management. The issue should be familiar: does the benefit of new management constitute value reasonably equivalent to the
value of the assets hypothecated to secure repayment of the acquisition financing? It depends whom you ask.
In their article questioning the very legitimacy of fraudulent
transfer law ab initio, Professors Baird and Jackson allow "[e]ven
under the narrowest view of fraudulent conveyance law, the leveraged
buyout may be a fraudulent conveyance." 37 They go so far as to suggest that the transactions might constitute intentional fraud on junior
unsecured creditors. 38 But then they dismiss such investigations of
intent as a "messy inquiry" and move onto the constructive fraudulent transfer issues. I'll come back to that mess in the next section.
Baird and Jackson conclude that LEOs do not clearly prejudice unsecured creditors' rights: "[w]ith the buyout may come more streamlined and more effective management." 39 Moreover, if the
corporation's creditors who had antipledge covenants in their agree3 6 Aices & Dorr, supra note 9, at 560. See also Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts in Bankruptcy, 20 Ga. L. Rev. 73, 80-83 (1985) (very helpful description of typical leveraged business
acquisition contexts).
3 7 Baird & Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 Vand. L.
Rev. 829, 85 I (1985).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 853.
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ments with the corporation did not accelerate the corporation's indebtedness at the time of the LBO, the transaction was probably in
the best interests of all junior unsecured creditors (or at least those
with enough clout to insist upon an antipledge covenant).
Carlson does not subscribe to the Baird and Jackson analysis,40
though he does agree with their conclusion.41 Carlson's LBO article
considers such acquisitions in the bankruptcy context,42 focusing on
the "savings provision'' of section 548(c), not its actual or constructive fraudulent conveyance provisions. Because bankruptcy law is
necessarily federallaw, 43 Carlson is able to rely on federal precedent44
to support his conclusion that an LBO should only be set aside as a
fraudulent transfer when the creditor who supplied the acquisition financing in exchange for an all-assets security interest did so knowing
that the debtor corporation was insolvent and knowing that bankruptcy proceedings were on the horizon. 45 It is not at all clear, however, that state uniform fraudulent transfer law will follow federal
precedent; indeed, it is likely that some would question Carlson's
reading of federal precedent. 46
It is difficult to read too much into the case law concerning
LBOs. One of the more infamous cases, striking down an LBO, includes a truly unsavory cast of characters.47 Arguably, however,
Carlson, supra note 36, at 102-03.
Id. at 102 n.95.
42 II U.S.C. § 548 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
43 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
44 See Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438 (1917) (mortgage interest securing outstanding unsecured loan fraudulent because lender knew of debtor's imminent bankruptcy).
4 5 Carlson, supra note 36, at 76-77. See also id. at 120-21 ("(T]he LBO lender should have
a defense against fraudulent conveyance liability whenever the lender believes in good faith
that it is financing a corporate acquisition with a decent chance of survival.").
46 To limit the Dean proscription to cases in which the lender knew of the debtor's imminent bankruptcy, Professor Carlson cited Justice Brandeis' dictum:
The mortgage may be made in the expectation that thereby the debtor will extricate himself from a particular difficulty and be enabled to promote the interest of
all other creditors by continuing his business. The lender who makes an advance
for that purpose with full knowledge of the facts may be acting in perfect "good
faith."
Carlson, supra note 36, at 88-89 (citing Dean, 242 U.S. at 444). Indeed, it is upon a construction of that dictum that a gopd deal of Carlson's thesis depends. But the Court's Dean decision largely defers to the lower court's factual determinations and does not suggest that only
showing lender knowledge of imminent bankruptcy would support avoiding the transaction as
intentionally fraudulent. The Court noted that "(i]t is a question of fact in each case what the
intent was with which the loan was sought and made." 242 U.S. at 444. The Court cited
several cases to support the conclusion "that a mortgage is a fraudulent conveyance where
taken as security for a Joan which the lender knows is to be used to prefer favored creditors
...." Id. at 445 n.l.
47 See United States v. Gleneagles lnv. Corp., 565 F. Supp. 556 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (former
labor union president Jimmy Hoffa provided collateral for loan transaction that looked suspi40
41
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LBOs might in some circumstances be assailable even if the plaintiff is
not able to imply organized crime connections. But a recent California federal district court case suggests that plaintiffs seeking to set
aside LBOs as fraudulent transfers might have a tough row to hoe. In
Credit Managers Association v. Federal Co. ,48 the court construed California's fraudulent conveyance statute as not providing a basis to
avoid the LBO as constructively fraudulent. 49 Reluctant to tackle the
larger issue--whether the scope of fraudulent conveyance law is
broad enough to reach LBOs at al150- the court found that on the
facts presented, the plaintiffs were unable to show that the acquired
corporation was undercapitalized after the transaction. 51 But the key
to the opinion is in the court's discussion of the plaintiffs' standing to
attack the LBO:
These [plaintiff] creditors made a post-buyout decision to extend
credit on new terms to a new entity, an entity with a very different
financial structure than its predecessor. As the creditors plaintiff
represents did not have any substantial stake in [the acquired corporation] at the time of the buyout, there does not appear to be a
strong reason to give these creditors the right to attack the buyout
as harmful to them. It would seem that if leveraged buyouts are to
be susceptible to attack on fraudulent conveyance grounds, only
those who were creditors at the time of the transaction should have
a right to attack the transaction. 52
That point is well-taken, and further discussion of Credit Managers
below explores the ramifications of the court's analysis and the coincidental generic fraud principles implicated. 53
Whether it is appropriate to view corporate guaranties and leveraged business acquisitions in terms of constructive fraud issues, it
seems clear that scholarship and recent case law have adopted that
ciously like money laundering scheme) aff'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. United States v.
Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3229 (1987).
48 629 F. Supp. 175 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
49 The plaintiff did not allege intentional fraud but urged three alternative legal theories
which the court acknowledged. Id. at 177.
so The court chose not to confront the "important conceptual question" of whether fraudulent conveyance law applies to leveraged buyouts at all. Id. at 179 (citing Baird & Jackson,
supra note 37, at 832-33, 852).
st 629 F. Supp. at 183.
S2 ld. at 180.
53 For other cases concerning leveraged business acquisitions, see Wells Fargo Bank v.
Desert View Bldg. Supplies (In re Desert View Bldg. Supplies), 475 F. Supp. 693 (D. Nev.
1978) (proscribing use of undercapitalized company to trick creditors into inevitable loss and
provide preferred creditors relatively safe investment), aff'd, 633 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1980); In
re Process·Manz Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ill. 1964) (addressing rights of subsequent
creditor who refinances an LBO debt), rev'd on other grounds, 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967).
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perspective, though perhaps without thoroughly considering the intentional fraud issues. Recent decisions concerning upstream and
cross-stream guaranties respond, albeit sub silencio, to Rosenberg's
constructive fraud suggestions. 54 Similarly, Credit Managers contained several references to Baird and Jackson's LBO article55 which
dismissed summarily any suggestion that application of intentional
fraudulent conveyance law would advance the inquiry. I endeavor, in
the next sections of this Article, to follow the road less traveled. 56

B.

Overview of Apposite Generic Fraud Principles

By generic fraud I mean no more than the common law of misrepresentation and deceit. 57 For example, Koch represents to Cuomo
that he, Koch, has marketable title to the Brooklyn Bridge and induces Cuomo to purchase the Bridge for the reasonable sum of
$500,000. After the transaction, Cuomo discovers that he has been
taken and brings a misrepresentation action against Koch because
Koch did not in fact have marketable title to the Bridge and took
advantage of Cuomo. In such a case, a misrepresentation action
would probably exist, subject to Koch's defense based on plaintiff's
inability to show reasonable reliance. Elements of the fraud or misrepresentation action have been formulated in various terms. Essentially, the action requires that plaintiff show defendant made a false
representation of a material fact, which defendant knew to be false
when made, upon which plaintiff reasonably relied, and as a result of
which plaintiff suffered damages. 58
Cases construing and applying those elements in commercial and
non-commercial settings are myriad and, predictably, have nothing to
do with upstream guaranties of leveraged business acquisitions. If a
54 See Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Goldman (In re Ollag Constr. Equip.), 578
F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1978); Consove v. Cohen (In re Roco Corp.), 21 Bankr. 429 (Bankr. 1st Cir.
1982), aff'd, 701 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1983); Lawless v. Eastern Milk Producers (In re Stop-NGo, Inc.), 30 Bankr. 721 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983); TeleFest, Inc. v. VU-TV, Inc., 591 F. Supp.
1368, 1373, 1380 (D.N.J. 1984) (citing Rosenberg and Coquillette). ld. at 1373, 1380.
55 See Credit Managers, 629 F. Supp. at 177, 179-80, 182.
56 See R. Frost, The Road Not Taken, stanza 4, lines 19-20.
57 The elements of fraud, however, are pro~ided by statute in some states. See, e.g., Ala.
Code§§ 6-5-100 to -104 (1975); Cal. Civ. Code§§ 1571-1574 (West 1982); Ga. Code Ann.
§§ 51-6-1 to -4 (1981); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 9-03-07 to -10 (1975); S.D. Codified Laws Ann.
§ 20-10-2 (1987).
ss The number of elements constituting fraud varies. See, e.g., Heyl v. Heyl, 445 So. 2d 88
(La. Ct. App.) (two), cert. denied, 446 So. 2d 1228 (La. 1984); Bowman v. McElrath Poultry
Co., 468 So. 2d 879 (Ala. 1985) (four); Gitschel v. Sauer, 212 Neb. 454, 323 N.W.2d 93 (1982)
(six); Wagner v. Casteel, 136 Ariz. 29, 663 P.2d 1020 (1983) (nine). The number of elements
is more often a matter of how the elements are separated and counted than a matter of
substance.
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guaranty or LBO plaintiff can convince a court to apply UFfA section 4(a)(l)-proscribing transfers made or obligations incurred by a
debtor "with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of
the debtor" 59-a misrepresentation action could be stated. If generic
fraud law is not the source of the "defraud" alternative, and a worthwhile measure of its impact, I have trouble seeing what else could
determine the term's proper construction.
The problems presented by engrafting the essential elements of
fraud wholesale onto the intentional fraudulent transfer law may be
overcome by analyzing application of fraud principles in stages. First,
in the Brooklyn Bridge example, the similarity between the bridge's
seller and the secured lender in the guaranty and LBO contexts must
be established. Vis-a-vis the junior unsecured creditors of the guarantor or acquired corporation, the lender's action often profoundly undermines their interests. Before the transaction the unsecured
creditors were doing business with a solvent entity.60 After the transaction it is unclear whether the debtor can fulfill its obligations to
unsecured creditors. The corporation's liabilities have been increased
without the addition of a counterbalancing asset. Even the Credit
Managers court, in the LBO context, acknowledged as much. 61
Second, generic fraud generally requires a misrepresentation or
its equivalent. In the guaranty and LBO cases it is difficult to see
what might be construed as a misrepresentation, or even a representation at all. But several recent fraud cases have confronted this very
problem-a situation in which one party seems to have taken advantage of another without uttering a word. For instance, in Johnson v.
Smith,62 a not atypical fraud case, a buyer of real property took advantage of the seller by including a bilateral death provision in the
note which the seller would accept in payment for the property. The
clause provided that upon the purchaser's death the property would
revert to the seller, and upon the seller's death the debt evidenced by
the note would automatically extinguish. When the note was executed, the buyer was twenty-five and the seller was seventy-five years
old. The court determined that inserting the death clause in the note
was fraudulent: "Misrepresentation . . . is not the only method
through which fraud is practiced. To the contrary, fraud may be acted as well as spoken. " 63
59
60

61

62
63

U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(l), 7A U.L.A. 652 (emphasis added).
Or, at least more likely solvent.
Credit Managers, 629 F. Supp. at 186.
697 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
ld. at 632.
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The misrepresentation element may be satisfied without a representation at all in failure-to-disclose cases because silence may be actionable. That result is arguably inconsistent with the common law,
and therefore is strictly circumscribed. 64 The elements of fraudulent
concealment have been recited in the cases: concealment of material
fact which should be disclosed; defendant's knowledge of the concealment; plaintiff's ignorance of fact concealed; defendant's intention
that the concealment be acted upon by plaintiff; damage to plaintiff.65
Before courts will impose a duty to disclose, they often need to find
some special relationship between the party who should have disclosed a fact and the nondisclosure's victim. This should not be confused with the constructive fraud cases, considered below, 66 in which
the existence of a fiduciary relationship must be shown. While a fiduciary relationship would satisfy the relationship requisite in failure-todisclose cases, 67 a less intimate relation will often suffice. In determining whether a given relationship gives rise to the duty to disclose, the
courts look to the nature of the information not disclosed. In Coface
v. Optique Du Monde, Ltd.,68 for example, a guarantor failed to disclose to the creditor that the principal obligor was insolvent and
would be unable to discharge its obligation. The court, relying on
New York precedent69 and a Second Circuit opinion in accord with
that precedent, 70 refused to find a debtor-creditor relationship sufficient to trigger the duty to disclose. 71
As a surrogate for any type of confidential or fiduciary relationship, some courts take a more direct approach to redress the bargaining imbalance which is the substance of failure-to-disclose cases.
· One's "superior knowledge" sometimes imposes a duty to disclose. In
SFM Corp. v. Sundstrand Corp., 72 a federal district court in Illinois
64 See Moldofsky v. Stregack, 449 So. 2d 918, 919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (mere fact of
non-disclosure ordinarily does not constitute actionable fraud).
65 See Kopeikin v. Merchants Mortgage & Trust Corp., 679 P.2d 599, 601 (Colo. 1984);
Ackmann v. Merchants Mortgage & Trust Corp., 645 P.2d 7 (Colo. 1982); Morrison v. Goodspeed, 100 Colo. 470, 68 P .2d 458 (1937).
66 See infra notes 85-96.
67 See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (pretransaction duty to disclose
arises from fiduciary duty); Thompson v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 539 F. Supp.
859 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (duty to speak arises from trust and confidence inherent in fiduciary
relationship), aff'd, 709 F.2d 1413 (11th Cir. 1983); Friedman v. Jablonski, 371 Mass. 482,
358 N.E.2d 994 (1976) (silence cannot constitute fraudulent concealment absent fiduciary
relationship).
68 521 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
69 See Amend v. Hurley, 293 N.Y. 587, 59 N.E.2d 416 (1944).
7 0 See Archawski v. Hanioti, 239 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 984
(1957).
7 1 Coface, 521 F. Supp. at 504.
72 99 F.R.D. 101 (N.D. III. 1983).
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applied Illinois law to what was essentially a breach of contract action,73 recognizing that "[a]ny prediction of future events (or statement of intention) or opinion may be deemed fraudulent if the person
making the representation has or professes to have superior knowledge. " 74 The SFM defendant was a manufacturer of non-conforming
equipment which caused loss to the plaintiff-buyer. Certainly the
manufacturer would be in a better position than its customers to
know the capabilities of the machinery it sells. The "superior knowledge" approach has been used by other courts. 75
As an intermediate position between the failure-to-disclose and
the constructive fraud cases, some states have fashioned a form of
strict liability for the consequences flowing from entirely innocent
misrepresentation. Some states provide for such liability by statute. 76
Authority in other jurisdictions suggest that in some circumstances
plaintiff need not even show that defendant should have appreciated
the inaccuracy of a misrepresentation which caused plaintiff damage.
Susser Petroleum Co. v. Latina Oil Corp. 77 relied on section 552 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts78 and construed that section, perhaps
somewhat creatively, to provide strict liability:
This section imposes liability upon a party that supplies false information in the course of business for the guidance of others in their
business transactions and it is immaterial whether or not such misrepresentation was made innocently or deliberately or with a
fraudulent or dishonest intent.... To be actionable, the representation need only be false either by accident or intent. 79
It is difficult to see how an innocent misrepresentation is the same as
negligent misrepresentation. To hold an innocent defendant liable is a
form of strict, if not absolute, liability. And plaintiff's counsel in
73 Sometimes the line between breach of contract and fraud is hard to distinguish factually.
Indeed, whether the case is tried and decided as one or the other often depends on which
theory the plaintiff pursues.
74 99 F.R.D. at 105. Accord Aaron Ferer & Sons Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, Nat'l
Ass'n, 731 F.2d 112, 123 (2d Cir. 1984); Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc.,
524 F.2d 275, 283 (2d Cir. 1975).
75 See, e.g., Aaron Ferer & Sons, 731 F.2d at 123 (duty to disclose arises where one party
possesses superior knowledge not available to the other); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milburn,
615 F.2d 892, 895 (lOth Cir. 1980) (defendant's superior knowledge constitutes exception to
general rule that misrepresentation of law is not actionable as fraud); Magnaleasing, Inc. v.
Staten Island Mall, 428 F . Supp. 1039, 1043 (S.D.N.Y.) (where one party has superior knowledge, expression of opinion may form basis for actionable fraud), aff'd, 563 F.2d 567 (2d Cir.
1977).
76 See Ala. Code § 6-5·104(b)(3) (1975); Cal. Civ. Code§ 1573 (West 1982).
77 574 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978).
78 ld. at 832.
79 Id.
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states which equate innocent with negligent misrepresentation will
likely pick up on the advantage such a formulation provides the party
bearing the burden of proof. In Susser Petroleum, plaintiff alleged
that defendant had misrepresented the availability of certain aviation
fuel, and plaintiff relied on defendant's representations that the fuel
would become available when in fact it did not. The court was not
persuaded by defendant's contention that plaintiff's failure to prove
negligence compromised plaintiff's maintenance of the misrepresentation action. Because the supplier-defendant was in a position to know
plaintiff's needs and, by the nature of defendant's business, impliedly
engaged to make only responsible and accurate representations regarding the particular matters in issue, defendant could not deny
plaintiff's right to rely on the representation; the defendant's innocence or bona fides were simply not proper matters for the court's
consideration. 80
A bankruptcy case applying Virginia law recited the state's common law rule that innocent misrepresentation is actionable. 81 The
court cited a 1957 Virginia Supreme Court decision recognizing that
"[w]hether the representation is made innocently or knowingly, if acted on, the effect is the same. " 82 In Virginia, at least according to its
Supreme Court in 1957, innocent misrepresentation is a special form
of constructive fraud. Though imposing liability for innocent misrepresentation has been described by venerable authority as a minority
position,83 the scope of constructive fraud is broad enough to include
liability for innocent misrepresentation and the cause of action for
constructive fraud is recognized in the vast majority of jurisdictions. 84
Constructive fraud liability is premised on a breach of duty arising
from a fiduciary or confidential relationship. It is sometimes referred
to as "legal" or "moral" fraud; the law imputes liability to a relatively
innocent party in order to vindicate an overriding public or even private interest. The courts suggest defendant's moral guilt has nothing
to do with constructive fraud. 85
In practice, the decisions betray an uneasy tension between the
80

Id.

Community Hosp. v. Musser (111 re Musser), 24 Bankr. 913 (W.O. Va. 1982).
82 ld. at 923 (citing B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Benjamin T. Crump Co., 199 Va. 312, 99
S.E.2d 606 (1957)); Leeds v. Mundy, 212 Va. 475, 184 S.E.2d 751 (1971).
83 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 25 (1943).
8 4 E.g., Ala. Code§ 6-5-104(b)(3) (1975) (equating constructive fraud with negligent misrepresentation); Cal. Civ. Code§ 1573 (West 1982) (same). Most states, however, fix constructive fraud liability by operation of common law instead of by statute.
ss See Miskimins v. City Nat'l Bank, 248 Ark. I 194, 456 S.W.2d 673 (1970); Coffey v.
Wininger, 1561nd. App. 233, 296 N.E.2d 154 (1973); Snell v. Cornehl, 81 N.M. 248,466 P.2d
.
94 (1970).
81
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inclination to limit this form of essentially strict liability and the desire to make whole a plaintiff who fell victim to her own ignorance
when relying on the misrepresentations. Two considerations guide judicial application of constructive fraud principles: (1) limitations on
the contexts in which liability arises-the nature of the relationship
between plaintiff and defendant; and (2) limitations on plaintiff's use
of constructive liability theory--offensively, to recover damages, or
merely defensively, to avoid suffering a loss in reliance.
Evidence that constructive fraud is not entirely distinct from negligent or innocent fraud is found in the cases discussing the nature of
the relationship between plaintiff and defendant requisite to imposition of constructive fraud liability. There is not an established list of
relationships which supply the necessary confidentiality or trust. 86 So
long as the court finds that the victim reposed particular trust and
confidence in the defendant-representor, the necessary relationship is
established. 87 Such trust or confidence may be established by showing
that defendant had greater expertise than plaintiff and that plaintiff
relied on that expertise. There are references in the cases to one
party's being "dominant" or "superior" in some way. 88
In some cases the reviewing court has deemed a vendor-vendee
relationship to impose a fiduciary duty on the defendant. 89 Other
courts have refused to find the necessary relationship between a bank
and borrower.90 Zeilenga v. Stelle Industries 91 recited the factors to
be considered in determining the existence of a confidential relationship between plaintiff and defendant: kinship, age difference, plaintiff's health and mental condition, and the extent to which plaintiff
relied on defendant in the course of plaintiff's business and financial
86 But see United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 485 F. Supp. 1049, 1060
(E.D.N.C. 1980) (suggesting that there are indeed "certain known and definite fiduciary relationships"), aff'd, 649 F.2d 985 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1054 (1981).
87 Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 573 F.2d 976 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860
(1978).
ss See Ebeling v. Burson (In re Estate of Heilman), 37 Ill. App. 3d 390, 345 N.E.2d 536
(1976); Gross v. University of Chicago, 14 Ill. App. 3d 326, 302 N.E.2d 444 (1973); Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Rubenfeld, 72 Misc. 2d 392, 339 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Civ. Ct. 1972), aff'd, 77 Misc. 2d 962,
357 N.Y.S.2d 589 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974), rev'd, 48 A.D.2d 428,370 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1975), aff'd,
40 N.Y.2d 936, 390 N.Y.S.2d 57, 358 N.E.2d 882 (1976); In re Estate of McClatchy, 433 Pa.
232, 249 A.2d 320 (1969).
89 Mann v. Adams Realty Co., 556 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1977). But see Dugan v. Jones, 615
P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980) (generally no fiduciary obligations between buyers and sellers of
property).
90 See Boatman v. Citizens & S. Nat'! Bank, 155 Ga. App. 848, 273 S.E.2d 190 (1980);
Paskas v. Illini Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 109 Ill. App. 3d 24, 440 N.E.2d 194 (1982); Manson
State Bank v. Tripp, 248 N.W.2d 105 (Iowa 1976).
91 52 Ill. App. 3d 753, 367 N.E.2d 1347 (1977).
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affairs. 92 While the analogy is by no means perfect, it is useful to
compare the indicia of "control" catalogued in the UFTA definition
of "insider. " 93
Once a court has determined that defendant's relationship with
plaintiff gives rise to liability for constructive fraud, the issue remains
what relief is appropriate. One possibility is that upon establishing
the elements of constructive fraud, plaintiff shifts the burden of proof
to defendant to show that there was no over-reaching or fraud. 94
Generally plaintiff may rescind the contract induced by defendant's
misrepresentation. 95 Another view is that the elements of constructive fraud are parallel to those of breach of warranty and the same
remedies apply. 96
Debate concerning the role of punitive damages in fraud cases
also sheds light on the fundamental basis of fraud liability. Virtually
all states award exemplary damages in intentional fraud cases,
although the conditions prerequisite to such an award differ from
Id. at 757, 367 N.E.2d at 1349-50.
Section 1(7) of the UFTA states that "insider" includes:
(i) if the debtor is an individual,
(A) a relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;
(B) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(C) a general partner in a partnership described in clause (B); or
(D) a corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in
control;
(ii) if the debtor is a corporation,
(A) a director of the debtor;
(B) an officer of the debtor;
(C) a person in control of the debtor;
(D) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(E) a general partner in a partnership described in clause (D); or
(F) a relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the
debtor;
(iii) if the debtor is a partnership,
(A) a general partner in the debtor;
(B) a relative of a general partner in, a general partner of, or a person in control of the debtor;
(C) another partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(D) a general partner in a partnership described in Clause (C); or
(E) a person in control of the debtor;
(iv) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were the debtor; and
(v) a managing agent of the debtor.
U.F.T.A. § 1(7), 7A U.L.A. 644-45.
94 Humphreys v. Latshaw (/11 re Latshaw's Estate), 194 Kan. 747, 751, 402 P.2d 323, 328
(1965).
<JS See Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971); Hertz
Corp. v. Cox, 430 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1970); duPont v. Perot, 59 F.R.D. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Edward Greenband Enters. v. Pepper, 112 Ariz. 115, 538 P.2d 389 (1975).
96 Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966).
92

93
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state to state. 97 It is axiomatic that punitive damages are, by definition, intended to punish defendant, not to grant plaintiff a windfall.98
Courts have not been consistent in their requirements for punitive
awards. While some courts require no less than an absolute showing
of fraud, others are satisfied with establishing defendants' heightened
culpability. This inconsistency has created considerable confusion in
at least one jurisdiction.99 Given the nature of intentional fraud, it
seems ludicrous to distinguish between "wanton and willful" and less
sinister varieties.
Fraud is nasty, and anyone who perpetrates it is arguably as fit
for punishment as a common thief. Complications arise when less
than intentional fraud is actionable because punitive damages should
not flow from negligent, innocent, or mistaken misrepresentation.
The problem is framing a precise definition of "intent" explicit
enough to distinguish the levels of culpability delineated by different
types of fraud. What constitutes intent is determined by the interpretation chosen. One interpretation may require the intent to cause injury to plaintiff; another view may focus instead on a defendant's
intent to benefit at the plaintiff's expense. This tension is crucial
when the issue is construction of the UFTA's intent-to-defraud provision. In generic fraud law the rule seems to be that only proof of
wanton, willful, malicious, oppressive, or at least reckless behavior
will support exemplary recovery. 100 So long as plaintiff's counsel can
convince the court or the trier of fact that defendant is vile, or de9 7 But see Kammerer v. Western Gear Corp., 27 Wash. App. 512, 521, 618 P.2d 1330,
1336 (1980) {discussing Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws§§ 148(1), 145(2)(a), 171,
171 comments (b) and (d) (1971)), aff'd, 96 Wash. 2d 416,635 P.2d 708 (1981); ComputerSys.
Eng'g, Inc. v. Qante1 Corp., 571 F. Supp. 1365 (D. Mass. 1983), aff'd, 740 F.2d 59 (1st Cir.
1984).
98 See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts 11-12
(5th ed. 1984):
The policy of giving punitive damages has been a subject of much controversy. They have been condemned as undue compensation beyond the plaintiff's
just deserts, in the form of a criminal fine which should be paid to the state, if
anyone, with the amount fixed only by the caprice of the jury and imposed without
the usual safeguards thrown about criminal procedure, such as proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the privilege against self-incrimination, and even the rule
against double jeopardy-since the defendant may still be prosecuted for the crime
after being mulcted in the tort action.
ld. (footnotes omitted).
99 See Commentary, Punitive Damages and Fraud: Alabama's Deceptive Standard, 35 Ala.
L. Rev. 101 (1984).
100 See Zeman v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 699 P.2d 1274, 1286 (Alaska 1985) (where no
evidence of malicious conduct in record, and record also foreclosed reckless indifference, airline not liable for punitive damages); Durant v. Surety Homes Corp., 582 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.
1978); Stephenson v. Capano Dev., Inc., 462 A.2d 1069 (Del. 1983).
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fendant's behavior in the particular instance is vile, exemplary recovery will be granted.
Before drawing any conclusions concerning expanded application of the intent-to-defraud provision in the uniform law of fraudulent transfers, it is worthwhile to review a couple of other creditor
liability theories suggested by commentators. Professor Clark surveyed the normative bases of fraudulent conveyance law, equitable
subordination doctrine, dividend restraint statutes, and piercing the
corporate veil theories to formulate the proper influence of such
mechanisms on redressing imbalances among creditors of a fiscally
embarrassed debtor. 101 Few articles have been able to throw around
concepts such as Truth, 102 Respect, 103 Evenhandedness, 104 and
N onhindrance 105 and still be taken seriously by the commercial community. Professor Clark suggested that courts were using equitable
subordination and veil-piercing analysis to avoid the formal requisites
of standard fraudulent conveyance analysis. 106
More recently, Professor Schechter suggested that principles of
agency and partnership could be utilized to aid unsecured creditors of
101 Clark, supra note 7.
1o2 Id. at 509 (Truth mandates that "in connection with transfers of property rights to
others, a debtor is forbidden to tell lies to his creditors that will lead to the nonsatisfaction of
their claims.").
103 ld. at 510-ll. Clark "somewhat hesitantly" identifies respect as a normative ideal. Its
command
can be captured by a cliche: be just before you are generous. The debtor has a
moral duty in transferring his property to give primacy to so-called legal obligations, which are usually the legitimate, conventional claims of standard contract
and tort creditors, as opposed to the interests of self, family, friends, shareholders,
and shrewder or more powerful bargaining parties.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
104 Id. at 512. ("Evenhandedness, in its fullest expression, has two aspects"-the debtor
may not prefer one creditor over another when he is about to become insolvent and creditors
should not seek such a preference.).
I os I d. at 516. Truth, Respect, and Evenhandedness combine to form the ideal of
Nonhindrance.
106 Id. at 536. Clark writes:
In summary, equitable subordination is not only a functional equivalent of
conventional fraudulent conveyance law occasioned by procedural and administrative factors, but also serves the purpose of expanding application of the ideals of
Truth, Respect, and possibly Evenhandedness to situations which are not covered
by technical fraudulent conveyance law because it is, perhaps arbitrarily, limited in
its coverage to debtholder claimants against the debtor and to debtors who make
or suffer transfers of benefits.
Id. at 553. Clark also concludes that "the agency theory enunciated in piercing [the corporate
veil] cases serves a practical function similar to that of equitable subordination doctrine, in that
both avoid the perceived restraints of fraudulent conveyance law. Understandably, then, the
piercing cases suppress mention of that body of law." ld. These conclusions were reached
after thorough case analysis.
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a debtor whose assets have been depleted at the insistence of a creditor in position to exert control. 107 The rule he proposes is sweeping:
When a creditor has exercised substantial control over its debtor's
operations, and when that control has affected the payments made
or costs incurred by the debtor and has also enabled the creditor to
realize a potential benefit {whether or not actually received), then
upon the debtor's insolvency the controlling creditor should be
held liable for obligations of the debtor; such a creditor's liability
extends to all obligations incurred, either (1) during the period of
actual control or (2) before the exercise of control, but which resulted in the actual receipt of benefits by the creditor. 108

Schechter's proposal would produce consequences in the upstream
guaranty and LBO contexts beyond those contemplated by application of generic fraud principles and intentional fraudulent transfer
rules to attack certain guaranties and leveraged business acquisitions.
However, it seems that the object of the generic fraud law is very
much the same as the liability theories reviewed by Clark and
Schechter. The generic fraud cases described in this section betray
judicial impatience with actions of creditors in strong bargaining positions who take undue advantage of other commercial interests,
whether of parties with whom the powerful creditors deal directly or
other creditors with an interest in the welfare of such parties. While
generic fraud law protects B from A's misrepresentation, some of the
foregoing authorities suggest it is not a great analytical jump to permit B's creditors to complain when A utilizes its superior bargaining
position to prejudice those other creditors. That is precisely tlie situation in which unsecured creditors find themselves when a lender with
significant bargaining power causes a debtor corporation to hypothecate all of its assets to secure an upstream guaranty or financing for a
leveraged business acquisition.
C.

A Comparison of Intentional and Constructive Fraud

As discussed above, 109 most of the action in the guaranty and
LBO contexts has involved the constructive fraud provisions of uniform fraudulent conveyance law. Courts 110 and commentators 111
107

See Schechter, supra note 7.

ws Id. at 881 (footnote omitted).
See Rosenberg, supra note 12; text accompanying supra notes 13, 16, and 22.
See Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Goodman (/11 re Ollag Constr.), 578 F.2d 904
(2d Cir. 1978); Consove v. Cohen (!11 re Roco Corp.), 21 Bankr. 429 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982),
aff'd, 701 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1983); TeleFest, Inc. v. VU-TV, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 1368 (D.N.J.
1984); Lawless v. Eastern Milk Producers (In re Stop-N-Go, Inc.), 30 Bankr. 721 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1983).
111 See Rosenberg, supra note 12; Coquillette, supra note 19; Carlson, supra note 36.
IOIJ
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have assumed that in the vast majority of commercial guaranty and
LBO cases, only the constructive fraud provisions would come into
play because, to paraphrase a commercial law giant, lunches at the
bankers' club are not given to discussing how the customer might be
hoisted a little higher upon his own petard. 1 12 Nor should we assume
that lenders ponder means to prejudice the rights of their customers'
creditors. But it is not all that clear why enterprising plaintiff's counsel might not be willing to resort to the intent-to-defraud provision of
the UFTA to attack a guaranty or LBO. Once the relationship between constructive fraudulent transfer law and intentional fraudulent
transfer law is understood, it is no longer so clear that guaranties and
LBOs should not be subject to avoidance as transactions intended to
defraud the debtor/transferor's unsecured creditors.
All fraudulent transfer law in this country is a product of the
Statute of 13 Elizabeth, which proscribed
feigned, covinous and fraudulent Feoffments, Gifts, Grants, Alienations, Conveyances, Bonds, Suits, Judgments and Executions, ...
Which ... are devised and contrived of Malice, Fraud, Covin, Collusion or Guile, to the End, Purpose and Intent, to delay, hinder or
defraud Creditors and others of their just and lawful Actions,
Suits, Debts, Accounts, Damages, Penalties, Forfeitures, Heriots,
Mortuaries, and Reliefs.... ll 3

Certain indicia or badges of fraud developed only when courts became
frustrated by the need to prove subjective intent in Statute of 13 Elizabeth cases. 114 However, those constructive badges of fraud only grew
from the law's need to establish certain objective factors whose presence would imply the requisite fraudulent intent. The badges became
presumptions of fraud in American courts 115 which eventually focused more on the transfer's prejudicial effect on the transferor's credI 12 See Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 Yale L.J.
364, 376 (1952).
I 13 13 Eliz., ch. 5, § 1 (1570).
114 See Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601) (setting aside preferential
conveyance of debtor' s farm and personal property). The Twyne's court catalogued six particularly significant factors: (I) the debtor made a general transfer of all property; (2) the debtor
retained possession and use of the property; (3) the transfer was clandestine; (4) the transfer
was made "pending the writ"; (5) the parties created a trust to govern use of the property; and
(6) the deed explicitly vouched for its own validity and the parties' honesty and good faith. Id.
at 812-14.
I 1 s See S. Riesenfeld, Cases and Materials on Creditors' Remedies and Debtors' Protection
371-72 (3d ed. 1979). See, e.g., Bean-Chamberlain Mfg. Co. v. Standard Spoke & Nipple Co.,
131 F. 2 I 5 (6th Cir. 1904) (invalidating debtor's conveyance of majority of corporation's assets
to another corporation owned by debtor without inquiry into debtor's actual intent); Briggs v.
Sanford, 219 Mass. 572, 107 N.E. 436 (1914) (common law under Statute of Elizabeth created
presumption of fraud from conveyance by an insolvent for inadequate consideration).
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itors than on the transferor's intent. Although the result was a purely
constructive basis of liability, it was firmly grounded on the inten~
tional fraud principles of the Statute of 13 Elizabeth.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws which drafted the UFCA in 1918 116 was acutely aware of the
relationship between intentional and constructive fraud liability. In
order to make the decisions construing the badges of fraud more consistent among jurisdictions, the UFCA drafters provided that proof of
certain fact combinations would compel the conclusion that the trans~
fer should be avoided as fraudulent. 1 17 The original constructive
fraud provisions, then, were designed to clarify inconsistencies among
the states in their application of the badges of fraud, not to supplant
application of intentional fraud law. The constructive indicia incorporated into the UFCA were adequacy of the consideration received
by the transferor and solvency or insolvency of the transferor at or
immediately after the transfer.
The UFTA, following the model of the Bankruptcy Code, 118 con~
tinues those same indicia of fraud. 1 19 Even in the new Act there is no
suggestion that constructive fraudulent transfer law should displace
the operation of intentional fraud law. So, the argument here goes,
once the plaintiff/unsecured creditor is able to establish generic fraud
by utilizing the generic fraud construction of "intent," the guaranty
or LBO which compromises the unsecured creditor's rights in the
same way as misrepresentation or deceit would is subject to avoidance
as a transfer consummated with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud.
Even the UFTA's drafters, perhaps unwittingly, have recognized
the symbiotic relationship between constructive and intentional fraud~
ulent transfer law posited here. 120 It is not enough to consider a
transaction only from the constructive fraud perspective; the aspects
1 16 Professor William Draper Lewis of the University of Pennsylvania drafted the UFCA at
the request of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. In 1919,
the American Bar Association approved the Act. It was generally well received by the legal
community. See Radin, Fraudulent Conveyances in California and the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act, 27 Calif. L. Rev. l, 12 (1938) (the UFCA would add "clarity and breadth" to
state Jaw); Note, Remedies of a Creditor for Setting Aside a Fraudulent Conveyance with
Recommendations for Changes, 6 S.C.L.Q. 80,85 (1953) (UFCA is "highly desirable" because
it provides a "positive course" for creditors to follow).
117 See U.F.T.A., Prefatory Note, 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985).
I 18 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
119 The UFTA catalogs the indicia at§§ 4(a)(2), 4{b)(8), and 4(b)(9). Cf. U.F.C.A. §§ 3-4,
7A U.L.A. 448-49, 474 (1985) (constructive fraud provisions include adequacy of consideration and conveyances by insolvent).
120 See U.F.T.A. § 4, comment 3, 7A U.L.A. 653-54 (1985); Alces & Dorr, supra note 9, at
540-41.
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of the transaction which suggest an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
must also be considered. That point seems to be obvious, but that
guaranty and LBO commentaries focus on constructive rather than
intentional fraud intimates a lack of sensitivity to the relationship between the two bases for avoiding some commercial transfers as fraudulent. Once the relationship is obscured and transactors and their
counsel focus only on the objective indicia of fraud-the constructive
fraud provisions of the UFTA-important commercial interests may
be compromised because the role of intentional fraud theories is
ignored.
Analysis has generally focused 121 on whether the transfer was for
less than reasonably equivalent value 122 and rendered the transferor
insolvent or nearly insolvent. 123 Those considerations only matter
when a court is deciding whether the transfer was constructively
fraudulent. The focus disregards the interrelationship between constructive indicia and intent: constructive indicia are a surrogate for
intent and their absence in a given situation does not mean that intent
may not be shown. To suggest otherwise is to confuse the alternative
bases of avoiding fraudulent transfers, and to deny unsecured creditors in the guaranty and LBO contexts access to a viable theory.
Moreover, the focus on constructive fraud necessarily emphasizes
what I deem to be too often formal inquiries concerning the transferor's solvency. Just as commercial bankruptcy law has limited the
importance of insolvency, so should fraudulent transfer law. 124
Further, what constitutes reasonably equivalent value is unclear.
Should the benefit realized by an acquired corporation through introduction of new management constitute value reasonably equivalent to
the value of the assets hypothecated to accommodate the transaction?
It would seem to depend on one's perspective. Perhaps it would be
appropriate to measure the value of that infusion of new talent by
what it would demand in the marketplace. 125 But even that would be
an impossible task in the LBO setting.
Just because the shortcomings of constructive fraud analysis
might be manifest does not necessarily mean that intentional-generic
fraud analysis would be any better under the UFfA intent-to-defraud
See supra text accompanying notes 12-56.
U.F.T.A. §§ 4(a)(2), 4{b)(8), 7A U.L.A. 653 (1985).
123 Id. § 4{b)(9), 7A U.L.A. 653 (1985).
124 See Alces & Dorr, supra note 9, at 542-43, 557-63.
12 5 See Carlson, supra note 36, at 95 ("LBO produces new management with a credible
chance to increase cash How, thereby further improving the position of the unsecured creditors."). Baird & Jackson, supra note 37, at 853 ("With the buyout may come more streamlined and more effective management.").
121

t22
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provtston. In order to see how generic fraud principles could work in
the UFfA to address the problems in the upstream guaranty and
LBO settings, it is necessary to consider how the UFfA provisions
might be adjusted to reach the most sensible results. The hypothetical
bad man-counsel for the unsecured creditor-would want to use the
intentional fraud provision to get unlimited relief. To avoid that result but at the same time to provide a useful framework for reviewing
the impact of upstream guaranties and LBOs on unsecured creditors,
it is worthwhile to consider how the UFTA might be adjusted to balance the implicated commercial interests.

D. Application of UFTA Provisions to Upstream Guaranties and
Leveraged Business Acquisitions

Counsel for an unsecured creditor whose rights have been
prejudiced by an upstream guaranty or LBO could urge a court to
void the transaction as an intentional effort to defraud the unsecured
creditor and those similarly situated. Such a "bad man" would argue
that the effect of the guaranty or LBO was to remove from the unsecured creditor's reach a considerable unencumbered asset pool and
replace it with a subordinating all-assets security interest. The secured creditor took advantage of its superior knowledge and control
position to impair unsecured creditors' positions for the sake of improving the secured creditor's own position and with no substantial
benefit flowing to the debtor/transferor. Irrespective of the constructive fraud tests concerning insolvency and transfer of reasonably
equivalent value, the unsecured creditors have suffered. Crucial from
the perspective of generic fraud law, the all-assets secured party as
well as the debtor actually intended that the guaranty or LBO would
result in secured creditors being protected at unsecured creditors' expense. In fact the debtor's business very likely could not have continued to function and feed the lien of the all-assets secured party but for
the services and materials provided by unsecured creditors.
In the upstream guaranty situation, the guarantor corporation's
assets are encumbered in order to gain an extension of credit to the
parent corporation. The guarantor receives no direct benefit from the
transaction, though there is some argument that the guarantor must
benefit from the transaction or it would not agree to execute the guaranty. 126 Even if true, such a conclusion ignores the perspective of unsecured creditors prejudiced by the upstream guaranty: the corporate
guarantor has given up something in which the unsecured creditors
126

See Coquillette, supra note 19, at 435-38.
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had an interest but has not given up anything of real value to the
directors who executed the guaranty. The directors were not playing
with their own money but with the unsecured creditors' money. If
the guarantor corporation went insolvent before the guaranty was executed, the corporation's shareholders would stand behind the unsecured creditors' claims; after the guaranty they stand behind the
secured creditor. In either case they would receive little or nothing
upon liquidation. But the share which the unsecured creditors would
realize post-guaranty is significantly affected by the all-assets security
interest of the lender who received the guaranty. 127
If a court would agree with the badman, unsecured creditor's
counsel, that an upstream guaranty constitutes a transaction intended
to defraud the unsecured creditors, what limits, if any should be imposed on the theory's operation? Certainly unsecured creditors whose
.claims mature after the guaranty should not be heard to complain
because they could have searched, and perhaps did search, UCC filing
records to determine whether the guarantor/debtor's assets were encumbered. If after finding the lender's security interest such a postguaranty unsecured creditor was concerned with the guarantor's financial well-being, the unsecured creditor could have inquired further
of the guarantor corporation. But the case is different for unsecured
creditors with mature claims prejudiced by and at the guaranty transaction. Such creditors should be able to use the intentional fraudulent
transfer theory to set aside the upstream guaranty because the debtor
and secured party intended to destroy their valuable claim against the
debtor in favor of the all-assets secured creditor. The transaction afforded the debtor no valuable-but at best a speculative--counterbalancing benefit to which unsecured creditors could look in the event
the guaranty were enforced by the secured party.
The story is much the same for leveraged business acquisitions.
127

You might wonder whether all article 9 all-assets secured transactions so prejudice unsecured creditors' interests that they should be subject to fraudulent transfer attack. Of course
the response to that speculation is that in a commercial finance transaction the debtor receives
value on account of the grant of a security interest and the secured creditor can never recover
more than that value should the creditor foreclose the security interest. But either an upstream guaranty or a subordinating all-assets se.curity interest may impair unsecured creditors'
positions. Arguably, the UFfA's drafters were sensitive to the possibility. Section 4, comment 3, focuses on the secured transaction from the perspective of the affected unsecured creditors and suggests that such an arrangement may betray an intent to defraud. If the unsecured
creditor can show that the all-assets security interest was granted to "hinder, delay or defraud," the transfer will be avoidable as intentionally fraudulent. Doesn't an all-assets lender
intend to protect its own position and often necessarily at the expense of unsecured creditors?
Aggressive use of the intentional fraud provision might lead to an avoidance of a significant
number of article 9 transactions. Courts should not get carried away from the perspective of
20-20 hindsight.
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While the acquired company may benefit from new management, it is
hard for unsecured creditors, quite literally, to bank on that. Therefore the existing unsecured creditors have, once again, been deprived
of a benefit. Again, however, the problem is with limiting the scope of
the intentional fraudulent transfer attack; only unsecured creditors
with matured claims at the LBO should have standing to avoid the
transaction. 128
To accommodate and limit the offensive strategy available to unsecured creditors seeking to avoid an upstream guaranty or LBO, the
UFTA must be amended by a provision that would operate much like
proximate causation in tort law. Rather than providing all creditors,
both present and future, the right to avoid an upstream guaranty or
LBO, section 4(a)(l) should be amended to provide that only creditors with mature claims at the time of the guaranty or LBO have the
right to set aside the transaction. 129 A new subsection 4(a)(l) would
read: "with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of
the debtor to the extent that the loss suffered by such creditor was
proximately caused by the transaction." Focusing on the causal relationship between the transaction prejudicing the unsecured creditor
and the loss or impairment he suffers will insulate upstream guaranties and LBOs from attack by post-transaction creditors. That conclusion is consistent with tort law because while liability for
intentional wrongdoing may be sweeping, it does not entail liability
for losses not caused by the malfeasance. 130
Alternatively, section 8 could be amended to provide a defense
for the transferee whose acquisition of an interest in the debtor/transferor's property did not cause a loss to the debtor's unsecured creditors. If the creditors continued to extend unsecured credit to the
debtor after the guaranty or LBO with knowledge or notice of the
transaction their loss was caused by their own imprudence, not by the
transferee's actions. Also to be insulated from liability is a transferee
who provides notice of the guaranty or LBO to the debtor's creditors
in a manner enabling the unsecured creditors to protect their posi128 This position is opposed to Schechter's suggestion. See supra text accompanying note
108. Schechter would also allow unsecured creditors whose claims had not matured at the
time of the LBO to avoid the transaction.
129 It is not at all clear, however, that the provision would concern only upstream guaranties and LBOs. Certainly all transactions which effect the same result-sacrificing the interests
of trade-unsecured creditors in a manner providing them marketable value in exchange for
subordination of their interests--should be proscribed by intentional fraudulent transfer law.
130 W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts§ 41 (5th
ed. 1984) (it is a fundamental proposition of tort law that an actor is not responsible for damages she did not cause).
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tions. The Credit Managers Association 131 court expressly noted that
the acquired corporation publicized the buyout to firms that did business with it. The result in that case brought by post-LBO creditors is
entirely consistent with the analysis suggested in this Article. Finally,
consider the Third Circuit's recent decision in the latest round of the
Gleneagles litigation, 132 invalidating mortgage interests as intentionally fraudulent because they lacked consideration and the transferor
and transferee knew of the creditors' claims and that the creditors
could not be paid. 133 Consideration to the debtor was lacking because
a substantial portion of the loan proceeds were going to former shareholders, the classic leveraged business acquisition. 134 The analysis
suggested in this Article would clarify and vindicate that result in all
upstream guaranty and LBO cases.
CONCLUSION

If nothing else, the argument suggested in this Article-likely to
be made by the "bad man" counsel for unsecured creditors seeking to
attack an upstream guaranty or LBO-is a bit myopic. It does not
pursue a thorough policy analysis invoking the gods of
microeconomic or even natural law theory to decide whether and
when guaranties and LBO's should be avoidable as fraudulent transactions. Instead, I started with the premise that plaintiff's counsel
should be expected to assert all available plausible arguments; then I
went about describing the basis of a plausible argument from generic
fraud law. Finally I observed that the argument could go too far and
I suggested a way to amend the UFTA to avoid unreasonable application of generic fraud law.
There is, of course, a downside to trying to anticipate the bad
man's arguments: perhaps plaintiff's counsel would be given ideas
they would not have developed on their own. One might also be accused of setting up straw men for the purpose of knocking them
down. Nonetheless it seems preferable to anticipate and then respond
rather than to sit back and await the worst. Had the UFCA drafters
629 F. Supp. 175, 180 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert denied,
107 S. Ct. 3229 (1987).
I JJ Id. at 1304.
I 34 We have decided that the district court reached the right conclusion here for the
right reasons. It determined that liT did not act in good faith because it was
aware, first, that the exchange would render Raymond insolvent, and second, that
no member of the Raymond Group would receive fair consideration. We believe
t31

132

that this determination is consistent with the statute and case law.
ld. at 1296.
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anticipated the Durrett 135 scenario, commercial law could have been
spared the uncertainty which prevailed until the UFfA resolved the
issue. 136
135 Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980) (invalidating foreclosure sale under § 67d of the Bankruptcy Act as a fraudulent conveyance because property was
sold for only 57.7% of its market value).
I 36 The UFTA resolved the Durrett issue by declaring that all "regularly conducted" foreclosure sales were unassailable. U.F.T.A. § 3, 7A U.L.A. 650. This may resolve little. See
Alces & Dorr, supra note 9. Enterprising counsel for the plaintiff need only argue that the
foreclosure sale was not "regularly conducted" and a "noncollusive" one, and the issue is
again open to litigation.

